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BOOK REVIEWS
Milton Wessel. New York: Columbia University Press. 1980. Pp. 312. $17.50 (cloth).
SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE.

Science and Conscience analyzes how American society can best approach the resolution of what the author, Milton Wessel, 1 characterizes
as the "modern socioscientific dispute."' 2 Socioscientific disputes are
marked by: (1) strong, widespread public attention and interest; (2)
'34
complex, highly technical issues; and (3) "quality of life questions.
Examples of these modern disputes include nuclear power, toxic compounds, economic-power concerns, and energy conservation.
The socioscientific dispute is unique to our age; its existence is attributable, in part, to a heightened public awareness of both the benefits
and the hazards of technology. Because of growing specialization, science is increasingly inaccessible to the public; yet, ironically, the layman
has an important stake in how these conflicts are resolved. As a result,
the public feels frustrated and helpless.
The author acknowledges that no easy solutions are available to
resolve these difficult, emotionally-charged social problems. Accordingly, he devotes the bulk of his work to defining and analyzing the
problems. In so doing, he attempts to set the stage for new and creative
solutions outside the traditional, and according to Wessel, unworkablemethods of conflict resolution.
The book's major criticism is of the adversarial system, which Wessel considers particularly ill-suited for resolving socioscientific disputes.
Wessel argues that the adversarial tactics of obfuscation and delay are
particularly unfair, and even dangerous in cases that involve the public
interest. They undermine public confidence in the judicial system as
well as in the corporate defendants' good faith. In the process, he repeats many of the familiar objections to the "sporting" theory of justice,
quoting from Dickens's Bleak House and from Pound's celebrated address
of 1906 to the American Bar Association. 5
Although the adversarial system can and often is abused, the auFormerly Visiting Professor of Law at Columbia, N.Y.U., Stanford, and Georgetown.
Now Lecturer in Law at Columbia and of counsel to a leading New York and Washington
law firm.
2 M. WESSEL, Science and Conscience xii (1980).
3 Id at 4-5.
4 Id at 18. Wessel introduces the concept of a "risk/benefit" analysis, which calls for a
comparison of the benefits of a proposed course of action with its "disbenefits" (all costs and
all risks).
5 Id at 39-40.
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thor's criticism seems unduly harsh. The real difficulty is that most socioscientific disputes, except of course for tort claims, do not belong in the
courts. Their presence reflects in part expanded notions of constitutional law. Primarily, however, they are in the courts because of the
failure of the legislature or of the executive to act.
Wessel does, however, critically address the role that corporations
now play in dispute resolution. Typically, corporations involved in socioscientific disputes refer the matter to counsel and then ignore it entirely. Counsel then assumes that its job is to win this particular case,
without regard to other consequences. Accustomed to the adversarial
method, it resorts to every trick in the book. Even when the corporation
attempts to supervise counsel, the situation is no better. The usual practice involves giving this responsibility to middle management, who are
eager to show a short-term profit. This again translates into an attempt
to "win," instead of tackling long-range problems.
Wessel contends that only by making top-level management responsible for counsel's behavior and dispute resolution can corporations
remedy this situation. Counsel should be appointed by a legal committee of the board and attend meetings of the board of directors. Counsel
must be made to see that its long-range interests are the same as the
corporation's, despite the apparent loss of its much-vaunted "independence." Then the board, or its legal committee, can see and weigh each
dispute as part of a much larger picture. According to Wessel, corporations will then be able to exercise and fulfill their responsibilities, not
only to themselves and their stockholders, but to the public as well.
Wessel also addresses the shortcomings of the scientific community.
He decries scientists' misapplication of risk/benefit analysis, their use of
an adversarial approach, and their failure to communicate to the public
the scientific and technological consequences of various options. Perhaps most egregious, however, is the scientific community's failure to
conduct proper risk/benefit analyses. Like laymen, scientists often fall
into the trap of making false and uninstructive comparisons. Hans
Bethe's table comparing nuclear power hazards with other types of danger is an example of such faulty reasoning. Bethe compares the number
of deaths per annum from motor vehicle accidents (50,000) with the
number of deaths per annum attributable to "routine" radiation emission (2), and the number caused by nuclear reactor accidents (also 2).
Apart from the dubious assumption that a small risk is acceptable, while
a large one is not, simply no comparison is possible between the two
types of hazards. 6 Wessel also faults the scientific community for its
practice of waiting until a catastrophe strikes before performing the nec6 Id at 12 7-28. A proper risk/benefit analysis would compare all the risks of nuclear
power with all the risks of not having nuclear power, including: human lives lost versus
human lives saved; health impaired versus health improved; contamination by radioactive

1982]

BOOK REVIEW

1013

essary studies and analyses. This post-hoc analysis results in biased witnesses (the notorious "battle of the experts"), incomplete analyses, and
7
prejudiced findings.
The author presents the scientific "consensus-finding conference" as
his chief proposal for reform. 8 The "consensus-finding conference" permits the scientist to follow his accustomed approach, without necessarily
assuming the role of impassioned advocate or alienated moderate. Wessel's model would bring together as many qualified scientists in a particular area as possible, assisted by lay participants and observers of varied
viewpoints. This group would attempt to isolate the issues, separate scientific questions from quality-of-life questions, and arrive at a consensus
on the scientific issues. "Consensus" should be distinguished from
"opinion." The goal is for the entire group to agree on how and to what
extent the scientific community is divided (if it is divided) on a particular issue.9
In order to succeed, a scientific consensus-finding conference should
concern itself only with scientific issues, and not with questions of policy.
The conference should seek-a consensus, without negotiation or bargaining. To ensure fairness on procedural matters, it should have an impartial chairman who is not a scientist. To maximize the usefulness of the
scientific consensus, the participants should be self-selected, with no
qualified scientist excluded. Ample preparation time must be provided
to afford wide publicity and permit full participation. Participation by
laymen as observers should be encouraged. Participants would be compensated only for expenses. The author voices the hope that industry
could be persuaded to cover the costs of the conference.
Wessel cites the 1975 and 1979 conferences on 2, 4, 5-T,10 and the
National Coal Policy Project (NCPP) as endeavors by the scientific community which approximate the consensus conference he envisions. In
material versus pollution and damage to the ecology caused by obtaining and using other
energy sources; independence from versus dependence on Mid-East oil; and so on.
7 An honorable exception is the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT). Although it owes its origin and financial support to the chemical industry, it is completely
independent. It makes continuous studies of important specific "commodity" chemicals in
order to discover any potential hazards, especially carcinogenic risks. Its findings are available to all. Although it is perhaps too soon to tell, Wessel thinks that CILT promises to be a
model for other branches of science and technology.
8 Wessel also briefly reviews alternative devices, such as panels of scientists, legislative
endeavors, and the proposed "Science Court," but dismisses them as either unwieldy or too
adversarial.
9 This type of consensus is distinguishable from a consensus arrived at by the traditional "scientific method," which is a long, drawn-out process, involving the gathering of
evidence, the formulation and testing of alternative hypotheses, the exchange of ideas, and
finally the publication of results in a scientific journal.
10 2, 4, 5-T is a herbicide which is widely used in agriculture and in range and forest
control. When combined with another, similar chemical, the result is "Agent Orange," a
defoliant that was widely used in Viet Nam.
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1974, the Environmental Protection Agency had some doubts about 2,
4, 5-T and scheduled a hearing to determine whether it should be
banned. Prior to the hearing, approximately ninety scientists, most of
thiem not associated with either side of the dispute, held a conference to
discuss the potential dangers of the herbicide. The report gave 2, 4, 5-T
a clean bill of health and the EPA dropped its charges, but the issue
reappeared when Viet Nam veterans claiming injuries caused by Agent
Orange filed suit against the federal government. Another conference
was held in 1979. Although an even larger number of scientists attended, it was markedly less successful. Most environmentalists boycotted the second conference, regarding it as a "sham" organized by and
in the interests of industry, the Farm Bureau, and the Department of
Agriculture. This experience demonstrates the importance of attracting
noncommitted scientists as well as advocates of particular scientific and
policy points of view.
NGPP represented an attempt by industry and environmentalists
to eliminate some of the environmental obstacles that prevented wider
use of coal as an energy source. Its principal focus was on economics,
sociology, and some of the applied sciences, and its emphasis, in contrast
to Wessel's model, was on the policy issues involved. Despite the absence of representatives from government, labor, or consumer groups, it
was successful; its two-volume, 814-page report "Where We Agree" has
been highly praised. The NCPP has been faulted by many, however, for
being elitist and nonrepresentative.
Wessel holds high hopes for the consensus-finding scientific conference. To the extent that a conference can achieve unanimity and clarity
on some issues, eliminate false questions, and thereby focus attention on
the real problems, it can achieve a great deal. Wessel, however, must
confront the objection that any self-selected group, no matter how seemingly impartial, is bound to be considered elitist. In addition, such a
conference will attract mainly those scientists most interested in the subject matter, who will nearly always be those who helped develop it, or
others with a similar bent. This unfortunately will lead to the type of
adversarial approach that Wessel is trying to avoid.
In his last chapter, "A Plea For Understanding," the author deplores the bitterness which so often permeates the environmental and
consumer groups on the one hand, and industry on the other. Although
one must applaud this desire to make peace between the warring factions, one must also recognize that the problems lie deeper than mere
disagreement on specific issues. We are dealing not merely with differences of opinion and abstract "quality-of-life" questions, but, quite literally, with matters of life and death-human and planetary survival.
The author's dispute-resolution proposals, aimed at laiwyers, corporate
managers and scientists, fall short of addressing the legitimate fears and
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confusion of the public. One cannot fault an author for not covering a
subject beyond the scope of his book. But the fact remains that the
problem goes far beyond mere dispute resolution, important as that is.
After all the disputes have been resolved, the basic problems will still be
with us. Mankind must solve these problems if we are to survive.
Robert S Pasley*

*
Frank M. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Emeritus, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1933,
LL.B. 1936, Cornell.

EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE

RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY. Gary L. McDowell Chicago and London:

The University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. 179. $20.00 (cloth).
For the reader interested in constitutional law, its growth in the
middle of the twentieth century, and the explosion of institutional litigation, this book seems full of promise. Its title promises an exploration of
the relationship between constitutional law and the equitable decrees
that have dominated the constitutional remedial horizon since Brown v.
BoardofEducaton. I Mr. McDowell's conservative orientation 2 promised,
I thought, a counterpoint to Owen Fiss's excellent studies of the relationship between traditional equity doctrine and modern constitutional
remedy.3 Perhaps because of my expectations, the book is disappointing.
The first five chapters summarize the history of equity, tracing its
development in the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Glanville, Bracton, St.
Germain, Coke, Bacon, Hobbes, Lord Kames, and early American writers. The book recounts the early American fears of equity jurisdiction,
the debate over whether equity courts should be distinct institutions,
and the battles between codifiers such as David Dudley Field and those
favoring fewer legislative norms. This background, however, is prelude
to the last two chapters, in which Mr. McDowell discusses the issue that
prompted him to write the book. He wishes to explore the legitimacy of
Supreme Court decisions implementing school desegregation. "Is the judiciary, on the basis of the Constitution, legitimately empowered to
make [the] policy choices" inherent in "such positive expressions of a
judicial will as busing to achieve racial integration, educational enrichment programs to combat the lingering effects of segregation, and lowincome housing distribution in our cities...

?-4

Mr. McDowell disapproves of these developments. He adopts a
fresh perspective in trying to show one of the ways in which the Court
has gone astray. The judiciary implements many of the Court's "positive expressions of a judicial will" through injunctive decrees. Because
injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, modification of the Court's
views on equity could alter some controversial decisions, particularly
school busing cases. Mr. McDowell proposes a change in attitude toward equity through greater fidelity to the historical scope of equity.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See, e.g., McDowell, Earl Warren's GoodIntentions Weren't Enough, Wall St. J., Aug. 26,
1982, at 20, col. 3 (reviewing G. WHrrE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982)).
3 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J.
1103 (1977).
4 G. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION Xv (1982).
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He claims that well-understood boundaries limited the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. The framers intended that these boundaries be implicit limitations on the powers of federal courts, and that these
limitations go a long way toward curtailing modern injunctive relief.
The above argument pervades the book, but Mr. McDowell also
offers more specific criticisms, two of which, in modern context, are
novel. Use of equity to grant relief to groups (such as Blacks), he claims,
departs from tradition:
The equity power was never intended to be used to grant broad
remedies to entire social classes; rather, it was intended to provide
particular relief to specific individuals in cases where the aggrieved
party had suffered a clear and irreparable injury for which the law, by
its generality, could not provide a plain and adequate remedy. The
invocation of the equity power by the Court in the school-desegregation cases has been little more than a sophistical means of cloaking its
policymaking in the comfortable trappings of traditional judicial lan5
guage. The result has been public policy, not equitable relief.
Mr. McDowell also believes that the merger of law and equity obscures
the traditional limits on equity and makes the judges exercising both
functions too powerful. He proposes "a stricter procedural distinction
'6
between law and equity."

The book's principal argument, that traditional equitable principles were meant to and should continue to bind constitutional interpretation,7 omits consideration of several relevant issues. Adoption of the
Constitution created a need to coordinate the new document with preconstitutional equitable principles. Equity developed in a political system unbounded by a written constitution, and in which courts were
closely allied with the executive. Doctrines developed in that context,
without modification, should not be expected to prescribe the appropriate relationship between post-constitutional judicial behavior and equity jurisprudence. Given the need for new coordinating principles, it
will not do to argue, as Mr. McDowell does, that the Court should simply return to early or pre-constitutional equity doctrine. If changes in
equity practice have occurred, they may simply be accommodations to
the different legal environment in which courts operate. Change does
not always signify infidelity to the past.
Mr. McDowell fails to address another issue that one who bemoans
the judiciary's alleged intrusions upon other branches of government
should discuss. The growth in nature and scope of the federal judiciary
has not occurred in a vacuum. Neither society nor federal and state
governments bear a strong resemblance to their eighteenth-century
5
6
7

Id at 121-22.
Id at 122.
Id at 4, 105-06.
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foundations. Congress and the Presidency in 1982 look little like they
did in 1789; both have undergone enormous expansions. Some scholars
recognize the potential relationship between the growth of the American
state and that of the judiciary." Scholars like Mr. McDowell, who urge
both strict adherence to principles of judicial restraint and fidelity to the
original separation of powers, may be demanding the impossible. Given
the growth of the state and of the nonjudicial branches, the Court may
be unable to fulfill its role in maintaining the separation of powers without doctrinal development that somehow corresponds to the growth of
the legislative and executive branches.
Mr. McDowell's narrower criticisms of modern equity cases also
need refinement. He claims that historically equity only provided relief
to individuals in cases in which legal remedies were adequate. In recommending that the Court embrace this view, Mr. McDowell ignores two
relevant lines of inquiry. First, even if equity were solely the servant of
individual litigants, the Supreme Court is not and has not been a forum
for individuals for more than half a century. The Court, by its own
rules, 9 and with Congress's and the nation's blessing, services issues, not
individuals. Even in the heyday of desegregation decisions, not all Black
litigants with strong discrimination cases received relief from the
Court.10 The Court's shift away from servicing individuals is distressing.
But there is no obvious way to modify its modern function without drastic and questionable changes in the federal judicial structure.
Second, Mr. McDowell oversimplifies the traditional role of equity
by ignoring equity's use as a vindicator of group rights. In particular, he
does not mention the connection between equitable decrees and modern
class actions. A rich literature exists in this field, some of which undermines Mr. McDowell's views about the Court's infidelity to the hypothesized individualist tradition of equity.I' It may be that he can reconcile
equity's role as the source of modern class actions with his perception
that equity only serves individuals, but such reconciliation requires express discussion.
Mr. McDowell also hopes that reseparating law and equity will
lead to a renaissance in the substantive equity doctrines that bound
courts of chancery.1 2 Given that merged courts do not disavow substan8

See, e.g., S. Skowonek, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NA-

TIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920, at 287-90 (1982).

9 Sup. CT. REV. 17 (1980).
10 See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). For
some of the background to the Court's refusal to dispose of Naim on the merits, see D.
PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 59-61 (1980).
11
See generaly Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 149-295 (1950); Yeazell, Group
LitigationandsocialContext- TowardA Histog of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1977);
Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action (pts. 1-2), 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 514, 1067 (1980).
12 G. MCDOWELL, supra note 4, at 106.
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tive equity principles, it is doubtful that reseparation alone will ensure
that future chancellors will feel restrained to the degree Mr. McDowell
desires. Reseparation or some lesser step to achieve stricter procedural
distinctions between law and equity probably would change little of.
substance, at the cost of increased procedural confusion. Such confusion
played no small role in eliminating the distinction between law and equity courts. At a minimum, Mr. McDowell should discuss how a new
separation would avoid the old problems.
Critics of the Court's implementation of the desegregation decrees
also owe some explanation of what the Court should have done. Two
obvious alternatives to the Court's approach are at least as unattractive
as anything the Court has done. First, the Court might have simply
declared state segregation statutes to be unconstitutional and left it to
localities to determine how integrated their formerly segregated schools
would become. But in school systems determined to resist pupil assignment systems that might lead to integration, the course of local events
often would frustrate any developments that might tend to end segregation. In this area, the Court correctly anticipated (or learned) that a
simple declaration of unconstitutionality would not suffice. Such a
course would have made a mockery of the rule of law.
Second, the Court might have relied on a traditional legal remedy,
money damages, to redress the deprivations visited upon students on
account of race. Prior and subsequent to Brown, the Court has approved
of monetary damages to redress constitutional deprivations. 13 Had the
Court imposed damages, critics of desegregation decisions could not allege distortions of equity doctrine and Mr. McDowell could not have
written this book. Many southern (and some northern) school districts,
however, would have no money to do anything but pay damages.
Mr. McDowell ignores the alternatives to the Court's chosen course
or treats them in a simplistic fashion. In his approving discussion of
merely declaring segregation statutes to be unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement, he fails to note that course of action's obvious
problems. 14 He does not mention the alternative of damages. These
omissions conveniently spare Mr. McDowell the task of carefully weighing the costs and benefits of the possible approaches to implementation
of desegregation orders.
Mr. McDowell, while approving of Brown, 15 does not like the course
of subsequent school desegregation decisions, and believes that something basic must be wrong with them. He focuses on perversion of eq13 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395-97 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 178-80 (1962); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268,

273-74 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
14 G. McDOWELL, supra note 4, at 109.
15' Id Butsee id at 97-98, 131-32.
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uity as the fatal flaw. This view may be worth further debate, but Mr.
McDowell's book fails to show either that the decisions implementing
school desegregation are uniquely unfaithful to equity tradition or that
greater fidelity to that tradition would lead to substantially different results. As constituted, his argument is neither enlightening nor persuasive.
Theodore Eisenberg*

*

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

